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Abstract
A drawback of most adaptive models is that they incorporate learning only of stage-game actions
rather than of repeated-game strategies. Yet, evidence from the laboratory suggests that, in many
games, subjects use repeated-game strategies. We modify the self-tuning Experience Weighted At-
traction (EWA-lite) model of Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2007) and use it as a computer testbed to
study the probable performance of a set of one-state and two-state automata in four symmetric 2× 2
games. The model suggested allows for a richer specification of strategies and solves the inference
problem of going from histories to beliefs about opponents’ strategies in a manner consistent with
“belief-learning.” The predictions are then validated with data from experiments with human sub-
jects and compared to the predictions of the (action)-EWA-lite benchmark model. Relative to the
benchmark, our modified EWA-lite model can better account for subject behavior.
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1 Introduction
In their seminal paper, Camerer and Ho (1999) introduced a hybridized workhorse of adaptive
learning, the Experience Weighted Attraction (EWA) model. Despite its originality in combining
elements of the fictitious-play model and the choice-reinforcement model,1 EWA was criticized for
carrying “too” many free parameters. Responding to the criticism, Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2007)
replaced two of the free parameters with functions that self-tune. Appropriately labeled, EWA-lite,
the self-tuning EWA is econometrically simpler than the prototype, yet still does exceptionally well
in a multitude of games in which strategies are stage-game actions. More specifically, Camerer, Ho,
and Chong (2007) indicated that EWA-lite does as well as EWA in predicting behavior in seven
different games and better than the Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) model benchmark of
McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). In fact, recently, Chmura, Goerg, and Selten (2011) noted that “the
good performance of the self-tuning EWA on the individual level is remarkable” (p. 25). Despite
its success in predicting behavior, EWA-lite has been constrained by its inability to accommodate
repeated-game strategies. As Camerer and Ho (1999) acknowledged in their conclusion, the model
will have to be upgraded to cope with a richer specification of strategies. In fact, the authors note
that “(i)ncorporating a richer specification of strategies is important because stage-game strategies
are not always the most natural candidates for the strategies that players learn about.” (p. 871)
A natural next step is to develop a strategic learning model in which players learn about the
performance of repeated-game strategies (see, also, McKelvey and Palfrey (2001), Erev and Roth
(2001), and Haruvy and Stahl (2002)) rather than about the performance of stage-game actions.
This is the goal of our paper. We modify the EWA-lite model so as to accommodate a richer
specification of strategies and solve the inference problem of going from histories to beliefs about
opponents’ strategies in a manner consistent with “belief learning.” Crucially, the modified EWA-
lite model nests the model of Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2007).
Central to our framework is a key assumption that imposes complexity constraints on the
candidate set of strategies so as to limit the number of potential strategies considered. In addition,
the players’ strategies are implemented by a type of finite automaton, called a Moore machine
(Moore (1956)). According to the thought experiment, a fixed pair of players is to play an
infinitely-repeated game with perfect monitoring and complete information. A player is required
to choose a strategy based on its attractions. Initially, each of the strategies in a player’s candidate
set has an equal attraction and, hence, an equal probability of being chosen. The strategies’
attractions are updated periodically as the payoffs resulting from strategy choices are observed. If
1The fictitious-play model operates on the premise that players keep track of the history of previous play by other
players and thus, can form beliefs about what others will do in the future based on past observation. Consequently,
players choose a strategy that maximizes their expected payoff given the beliefs they have formed. On the other
hand, the choice-reinforcement model assumes that strategies are “reinforced” by their previous payoff and that
the propensity to choose a strategy depends on its stock of reinforcement.
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strategy revision does occur, the new strategy is chosen on the basis of the updated attractions.
Over the course of this process, some strategies decline in use, while others are used with greater
frequency.
There exist many competing models to explain how individuals learn in a repeated-game
setting. In belief-based models, players tend to choose strategies that have high expected payoffs,
given beliefs they form by observing the history of play. Some special cases of belief-based models
are fictitious play, weighted fictitious play and Cournot best-response (Cournot 1960).2 To fit
data from coordination games, Crawford (1995) developed a more general belief model, allowing
idiosyncratic shocks in beliefs and time-varying weights. Crawford and Broseta (1998) extended
the model to allow ARCH error-terms and applied it to coordination with preplay auctions. Other
studies have concentrated only on reinforcement learning. Harley (1981) for example, applied a
reinforcement model using cumulative payoffs and simulated its behavior in several games. Roth
and Erev (1995) extended the Harley model to incorporate reinforcement spillovers to neighboring
strategies. Their model fits the time trends in ultimatum, public goods, and responder-competition
games, but the convergence is relatively slow. Finally, Hanaki, Sethi, Erev, and Peterhansl (2005)
demonstrated that a simple reinforcement model of learning applied to a population of agents
using a set of one-state and two-state automata accounts for the behavior of human subjects in
the Stag-Hunt game, the Battle of the Sexes game, the Prisoner’s Dilemma game and the Chicken
game − and does so without assuming that fairness and reciprocity are primitive concerns.
These studies of belief and reinforcement learning find that each approach, evaluated sepa-
rately, has some explanatory power. For example, reinforcement does better in constant-sum
games and belief learning in coordination games. However, Camerer and Ho (1999) introduced
a hybridized model of learning, the EWA model, which captures adaptive learning by combining
elements of, both, weighted fictitious play and reinforcement learning. A limitation of this ap-
proach is the fact that agents are not forward-looking, in the sense that they do not anticipate the
consequences of their strategy on their opponents’ future use of alternative strategies. In a sub-
sequent paper, Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2002) addressed this limitation by extending the EWA
model to capture sophisticated learning and “strategic teaching” in repeated games. In contrast,
the EWA-lite of Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2007) addressed criticisms that EWA has “too” many
parameters by fixing some parameters at plausible values and replacing others with functions of
experience so that they no longer need to be estimated.
Two unresolved issues of the EWA literature has been the need to incorporate a richer spec-
ification of strategies and to solve the inference problem of going from histories to beliefs about
opponents’ repeated-game strategies. The present study addresses this issue by modifying EWA-
2Boylan and El-Gamal (1993) proposed a methodology to assess the empirical justifiability of fictitious play
and Cournot learning in coordination and dominance-solvable games; in the experiments analyzed, they found
overwhelming relative support for fictitious play.
2
lite to allow for a richer specification of strategies and a belief-based learning rooted in players
updating their beliefs on the probability distribution of the other players’ strategies. We then
study the probable performance of a set of one-state and two-state automata in four symmetric
2 × 2 games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the Battle of the Sexes game, the Stag-Hunt game,
and the Chicken game. Finally, we validate the predictions of the modified EWA-lite model with
experimental (human) data and compare them to the predictions of the (action)-EWA-lite bench-
mark. Relative to the benchmark, the modified EWA-lite can better account for subject behavior.
More specifically, trends observed in the experimental lab, such as cooperation in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, alternation across the two pure-strategy Nash equlibria in the Battle of the Sexes
game, and mutual conciliation in the Chicken game (evading the two pure-strategy Nash equilib-
ria), are predicted by the modified EWA-lite model, but not by the (action)-EWA-lite model. The
rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the type of finite automaton used.
Section 3 explains the methodology. In Section 4, we present the results of the computational
simulations. In Section 5, we discuss and validate the results with data from experiments with
human subjects. In Section 6, we offer conclusions and direction for future research.
2 Finite Automata
To simplify exposition, we start with some notation. The stage game is represented in standard
strategic (normal) form. The set of players is denoted by I = {1, ..., n}. Each player i ∈ I has an
action set denoted by Ai. An action profile a = (ai, a−i) consists of the action of player i, and the
actions of the other players denoted by a−i = (a1, ..., ai−1, ai+1, ..., an) ∈ A−i. In addition, each
player i has a real-valued payoff function gi : A→ R which maps every action profile a ∈ A into a
payoff for i, where A denotes the cartesian product of the action spaces Ai, written as A ≡
I×
i=1
Ai.
In the infinitely-repeated game with perfect monitoring, the stage game in each period t = 0, 1, ...
is played with the action profile chosen in period t publicly observed at the end of that period.
The history of play at time t is denoted by ht = (a0, ..., at−1) ∈ At, where ar = (ar1, ..., arn) denotes
the actions taken in period r. The set of histories is given by
H =
∞⋃
t=0
At,
where we define the initial history to the null set A0 = {∅}. A strategy si ∈ Si for player i is,
then, a function si : H → Ai, where the strategy space of i consists of Ki discrete strategies; that
is, Si = {s1i , s2i , ..., sKii }. Furthermore, denote a strategy combination of the n players except i by
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s−i = (s1, ..., si−1, si+1, ..., sn). Each player i has a payoff function pii : S → R, which maps every
strategy profile s = (si(t), s−i(t)) ∈ S into a payoff for i, where S denotes the cartesian product
of the strategy spaces Si. Finally, player i’s payoff in period t is denoted as pii(si(t), s−i(t)).
Our motivation to use finite automata stems from our desire to reduce the computational bur-
den, as well as to reflect elements of bounded rationality and complexity.3 Using finite automata
as the carriers of agents’ strategies was first suggested by Aumann (1981).4 A finite automaton
is a mathematical model of a system with discrete inputs and outputs. The system can be in
any one of a finite number of internal configurations or “states.” The state of the system sum-
marizes the information concerning past inputs that is needed to determine the behavior of the
system on subsequent inputs. The specific type of finite automaton used here is a Moore machine
(Moore 1956). A Moore machine for player i, Mi, in a repeated game G = (I,{Ai}i∈I , {gi}i∈I)
is a four-tuple (Qi, q
0
i , fi, τi) where Qi is a finite set of internal states of which q
0
i is specified
to be the initial state; fi : Qi → Ai is an output function that assigns an action to every state;
and τi : Qi × A−i → Qi is the transition function that assigns a state to every two-tuple of state
and other player’s action. It is pertinent to note that the transition function depends only on the
present state and the other player’s action. This formalization fits the natural description of a
strategy as i’s plan of action in all possible circumstances that are consistent with i’s plans. In
contrast, the notion of a game-theoretic strategy for i requires the specification of an action for
every possible history, including those that are inconsistent with i’s plan of action.5
In the first period, the state is q0i , and the automaton chooses the action fi(q
0
i ). If a−i is the
action chosen by the other player in the first period, then the state of i’s automaton changes
to τi(q
0
i , a−i), and in the second period, i chooses the action dictated by fi in that state. Then,
the state changes again according to the transition function given the other agent’s action. Thus,
whenever the automaton is in some state q, it chooses the action fi(q), while the transition function
τi specifies the automaton’s transition from q (to a state) in response to the action taken by the
other player.
For example, the automaton (Qi, q
0
i , fi, τi) in Figure 1 carries out the Grim-Trigger strategy.
In the transition diagram, a vertex denotes the internal state of the automaton with the prescribed
agent’s action indicated in the center, and the arcs labeled with the action of the other player
indicate the transition to the states. Thus, the strategy chooses A, as long as both players have
3Bounded rationality suggests that a player may not consider all feasible strategies but must limit himself,
instead, to less-complex strategies. The complexity of finite automata may be defined in a number of ways. Our
definition is provided in the Appendix.
4The first application originated in the work of Neyman (1985), who investigated a finitely-repeated game model
in which the pure strategies available to the agents were those that could be generated by machines utilizing no
more than a certain number of states.
5To formulate the game-theoretic strategy, one would have to construct the transition function so that τi :
Qi ×A→ Qi instead of τi : Qi ×A−i → Qi.
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Qi = {q1, q2}
q0i = q1
fi (q) =
{
A if q = q1
B if q = q2
τi (q, a−i) =
{
q1 if (q, a−i) = (q1, A)
q2 otherwise
Figure 1: Grim-Trigger Automaton
chosen A in every period in the past, and chooses B otherwise.
3 Methodology
Players have attractions, or propensities, associated with each of their strategies, and these at-
tractions determine the probabilities with which strategies are chosen when players experiment.
Initially, all strategies have an equal attraction and, hence, an equal probability of being chosen.
The learning process evolves through the attractions of strategies that are updated at the end of a
cluster of periods. We abstain from the common practice of updating the attractions of strategies
in every period for two reasons. First, unlike actions, repeated-game strategies require several pe-
riods to be evaluated. Second, as Erev and Haruvy (2012) documented in their chapter, subjects
exhibit high probability of inertia during the game-play stage. More specifically, in some games,
subjects repeat their last action-choice in more than 80 percent of the plays, even after a realized
bad outcome. For these two reasons, we find it appropriate that players play the stage-game for a
cluster of periods before assessing their current strategy. The length of a cluster, denoted by Tχ,
can be fixed or determined stochastically. In this exposition, we assume that the cluster length is
fixed and is denoted by T .
The modified EWA-lite model consists of two variables that are updated once an agent switches
strategies.6 Crucially, we will assume that players update their strategies simultaneously. The first
variable is N(χ), which is interpreted as the number of observation-equivalents of past experience
in cluster χ. The second variable, denoted as Aji (χ), indicates player i’s attraction to strategy j
after the χth cluster of periods. The variables N(χ) and Aji (χ) begin with some prior values, N(0)
and Aji (0). These prior values can be thought of as reflecting pre-game experience, due either to
learning transferred from different games or to pre-play analysis. In addition, we use an indicator
function I(x, y) that equals 1 if x = y and 0 otherwise. The evolution of learning over the χth
6For a more detailed exposition on EWA-lite, see Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2007).
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cluster with χ ≥ 1 is governed by the following rule:
Aji (χ) =
φi(χ) ·N (χ− 1) · Aji (χ− 1) + I(sji , si (χ)) ·Ri (χ) + δji (χ) · Eji (χ)
φi(χ) ·N (χ− 1) + 1 . (1)
We outline next the differences between the modified EWA-lite model and the (action)-EWA-
lite model. First, the reinforcement payoff in the modified EWA-lite model, Ri(χ), is defined as
the average payoff obtained by player i over the χth cluster,
Ri (χ) =
1
T
∑
a∈h(χ)
gi (a) ,
where h(χ) is the sequence of action profiles played in the χth cluster. Second, the forgone payoffs
in the modified EWA-lite model are not as simple as in the case of the (action)-EWA-lite model,
where the opponent’s action is publicly observed in each period. In the modified EWA-lite model,
agents are not able to observe the repeated-game strategy of their opponent, but, rather, only
the sequence of action profiles in the cluster. Therefore, the forgone payoffs, Eji (χ), consist of
the expectation taken over the possible repeated-game strategies that could have generated the
specific sequence of action profiles in the cluster. Formally, a repeated-game strategy profile s is
consistent with a sequence of action profiles h, if the sequence h occurs when players play s. Let
B : S ×H → {0, 1} be an indicator function, which is 1 if the strategy profile is consistent with
the history h and 0 otherwise:
B (s, h) =
{
1 if s is consistent with h
0 otherwise.
(2)
Next, define belief function p : Si × S−i ×H → [0, 1] as
p(si, s−i, h) =
B((si, s−i), h)∑
r∈S−i
B((si, r), h)
, 7
which can be interpreted as player i’s belief that the other player chose s−i when player i played
si and the history was h. Notice that an agent i puts an equal weight across all other agent’s
strategies, s−i, which, when combined with si, are consistent with the history of action profiles in
the cluster. For example, if both players use, in the χth cluster, the “Grim-Trigger” automaton
as defined in Figure 1, then h(χ) consists of an all (A,A) sequence. Yet, the strategy profile in
which both players play “Grim-Trigger,” as well as the strategy profile in which player 1 plays
7We choose this form to maintain the one-parameter framework of Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2007). Alterna-
tively, a logit specification could be used to calculate the probabilities.
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“Grim-Trigger” and player 2 plays “All-A,” are both consistent with h(χ) and, therefore, each of
the two strategies of the other agent is weighted equally. Finally, the expected forgone payoff for
player i of repeated-game strategy j over the χth cluster is given by
Eji (χ) =
∑
s−i∈S−i
pii(s
j
i , s−i) · p(si, s−i, h(χ)).
In the original EWA model of Camerer and Ho (1999), the attraction function consisted of the
exogenous parameters δ and φ. In the (action)-EWA-lite model, these parameters are changed
from exogenous parameters to self-tuning functions δ(·) and φ(·), referred to as the attention
function and the decay-rate function, respectively. The attention function δ(·) determines the
weight placed on forgone payoffs. The idea is that players are more likely to focus on strategies
that would have given them a higher payoff than the strategy actually played. This property is
represented by the following function:
δji (χ) =
{
1 if Eji (χ) ≥ Ri(χ) and sji 6= si(χ)
0 otherwise.
Thus, on the one hand, the attention function enables subjects to reinforce only unchosen strategies
with weakly better payoffs by a weight of one. On the other hand, the decay rate function φ(·)
weighs lagged attractions. When a player senses that the other player is changing behavior, a
self-tuning φi(·) decreases so as to allocate less weight to the distant past. The core of the φi(·) is
a “surprise index,” which indicates the difference between the other player’s most recent strategy
and the strategies he chose in the previous clusters. First, define the cumulative belief function
σ : S−i × N→ [0, 1],
σ(s−i, χ) =
1
χ
χ∑
j=1
p(si(j), s−i, h(j)),
which records the historical frequencies of the beliefs, over the χ clusters, when the other player
chose strategy s−i. The surprise index Si(χ) simply sums up the squared deviations between each
cumulative belief σ(s−i, χ) and the immediate belief p(si, s−i, h(χ)); that is,
Si(χ) =
∑
s−i∈S−i
(σ(s−i, χ)− p(si, s−i, h(χ))2.
Thus, the surprise index captures the degree of change of the most recent beliefs from the historical
average of beliefs. Note that it varies from zero (when there is belief persistence) to two (when a
player is certain that the opponent just switched to a brand-new strategy after playing a specific
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strategy from the beginning). The change-detecting decay rate of the χth cluster is, then,
φi(χ) = 1− 1
2
Si(χ).
Therefore, when player i’s beliefs are not changing, φi(χ) = 1; that is, the player weighs previous
attractions fully, as indicated in (1). Alternatively, when player i’s beliefs are changing, then
φi(χ) = 0; that is, the player puts no weight on previous attractions.
Attractions determine probabilities of choosing strategies. We use the logit specification to
calculate the choice probability of strategy j. Thus, the probability of a player i choosing strategy
j, when he updates his strategy at the beginning of cluster χ+ 1, is8
Pji (χ+ 1) =
eλ·A
j
i (χ)∑
k
eλ·A
k
i (χ)
.
The parameter λ ≥ 0 in the logistic transformation measures the sensitivity of players to attrac-
tions. Thus, if λ = 0, all strategies are equally likely to be chosen regardless of their attractions.
As λ increases, strategies with higher attractions become disproportionately more likely to be
chosen. In the limiting case where λ→∞, the strategy with the highest attraction is chosen with
probability one.
4 Results
We have limited our attention to the four symmetric 2× 2 games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma game,
the Battle of the Sexes game, the Stag-Hunt game, and the Chicken game. The payoff matrices
are illustrated in Figure 2. To test the predictions of the modified EWA-lite model in these games,
we run computer simulations. Each simulation consists of a fixed pair of agents that stay matched
for 1,000 periods. The agents are able to choose from the set of one-state and two-state automata
depicted in Figure 3. At the beginning of the simulations, each agent is endowed with initial
attractions Aji (0) = 1.5 (as specified in Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2007)) for each strategy j in Si.
Players are also endowed with initial experience Ni(0) = 1. Players update their attractions at the
8An approach with an appeal to modelers desiring a highly-parsimonious model would be to calculate the
probabilities of attractions with the equation
Pji (χ+ 1) =
Aji (χ)∑
k
Aki (χ)
.
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Figure 2: Payoff Matrices
end of each cluster, which consists of 20 periods,9 and then simultaneously update their strategies
based on their new attractions. All simulations presented here use an intensity parameter λ = 5 in
the logit specification.10 The results displayed in the plots are averages taken over 500 simulated
pairs.
4.1 Simulations
Figure 4 displays the results of the simulations in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game (see Figure 2(a)).
The cooperative action is denoted with the letter A, whereas the action of defection is denoted
9Whenever players use finite-state automata, a cycle of action-pairs is eventually attained, though it may not
necessarily start at period 1. In fact, in this exercise, our upper bound of two states ensures that the cycle will be
attained by period 5. One may then ask: why not fix the cluster length at five periods? The mere fact that a cycle
may not start at period 1 can bias the payoffs in favor of the automaton that did better in the first period. For
expositional purposes, consider the action profiles of the first five periods of a pair consisting of the Grim-Trigger
automaton and the Always-Defect automaton. The ability to earn the “temptation” payoff in the first period would
bias the Always-Defect automaton favorably over the Grim-Trigger one, even though a cycle would consist of an
all-defections sequence. Thus, allowing for a cluster length of 20 periods, discounts the payoff earned in the first
period over the payoff earned in the entire cluster length.
10We have experimented with λ ∈ {1, 2, 3, 5, 10, 20, 50}. Our results are relatively insensitive to changes in these
values.
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Figure 3: Two-State Automata
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Figure 4: Prisoner’s Dilemma Game. Figures 4-7 all follow the same structure. Each pair of agents is matched
for 1,000 periods. There are 500 such pairs in the population. The automaton frequency plot shows the frequency
of play across 26 automata over 1,000 periods. In the probability progression plot, the difference between two
successive curves indicates the likelihood of an automaton being chosen based on attractions as the game evolves.
The frequency plot shows the frequency of each payoff combination over the final 200 periods and the set of feasible
payoffs. The payoff progression plot indicates the average payoff of the 500 pairs as the game evolves. The intensity
parameter λ is taken to equal 5 in all simulations.
with the letter B. Each player’s dominant strategy is to play B. Figure 4(a) shows the frequency
of automaton pairs played over the course of the repeated game. Thus, the larger the area of the
bubble, the bigger the frequency of play. The most common outcome is for both players to play
Automaton 12, the “Grim-Trigger” strategy. Figure 4(b) shows the progressions of probabilities
as determined by the attractions. That is, the difference between two successive curves indicates
the likelihood of an automaton being chosen. This plot suggests that in the Prisoner’s Dilemma,
towards the end of the 1,000 periods, only five strategies have strictly positive probabilities:
Automaton 1, 5, 7, 10, and 12. It is important to note that in any pair-combination between these
five automata, the cooperative outcome (A,A) is sustained, which rewards each player with a
payoff of 3. Figure 4(c) shows the set of feasible repeated-game payoffs and the frequency of each
payoff combination over the final 200 periods of the 1,000 period-interaction. The area of the
bubbe indicates the frequency of play. This plot shows that essentially all players are cooperating
over the final 200 periods of the interaction. Finally, Figure 4(d) shows the progression of payoffs
11
over the course of the interaction. The average payoff in the beginning is around 2.5, which is the
payoff that would be obtained if both players were randomizing. Payoffs then increase towards 3,
which is the cooperative-payoff outcome.
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Figure 5: Battle of the Sexes Game
Figure 5 shows the results of the simulations in the Battle of the Sexes (see Figure 2(b)). In this
game, there are two pure-strategy equilibria: (A,B) and (B,A). The frequency plot in Figure 5(a)
covers a large number of automata, although Automaton 21 shows up more frequently. Automaton
21 switches actions only if the opponent played the same action in the previous period; otherwise,
it continues with the same action. The large number of automata selected can be attributed to the
large number of action-combinations that can produce the two pure-strategy equilibira indicated
above. In addition, Figure 5(b) suggests that the two strategies that are most likely to be played
are Automaton 1 (which always plays A) and Automaton 21. Looking at Figure 5(c), we see
mass points at payoffs (2, 4) and (4, 2), which correspond to the two pure-strategy equilibria.
In addition, we also observe a mass point at (3, 3). This latter mass point corresponds to the
situation in which players alternate between the two pure-strategy equilibria. This behavior has
been observed experimentally (McKelvey and Palfrey (2001)) and would be impossible to obtain
using a model that allows only action-learning. Notice that in spite of observing the (3, 3) in
12
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Figure 6: Stag-Hunt Game
Figure 5(c), there is no corresponding mass point identified in Figure 5(a) because there are many
combinations of automata that lead to alternations. For example, if one player plays Automaton
5 and the other player plays Automaton 6, there would be alternations between the pure-strategy
equilibria. All in all, there are 32 combinations of automata that lead to these alternations. So,
even though no single automaton that leads to alternations can be identified, the combined impact
of all of these combinations leads to a significant number of alternations represented by the mass
at (3, 3) in Figure 5(c). Figure 5(d) shows that the average payoff per player converges very close
to 3.
Figure 6 shows the results of the simulations in the Stag-Hunt game (see Figure 2(c)). In
this game, there are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria, (A,A) and (B,B); however, (A,A) is the
Pareto dominant equilibrium. Plots (a) and (b) in Figure 6 suggest that there is weak convergence
to a small set of automata. In contrast, Figure 6(c) suggests that there is convergence to a specific
payoff combination: the Pareto dominant payoff of (3, 3). The payoff combination (2,2) also
appears on a much smaller scale and arises from an alternation of the two pure-strategy Nash
equilibria. Unlike the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, in which agents play strategies that punish
defectors, the Stag-Hunt is a coordination game with aligned interests. Therefore, there are many
combinations of automata that lead to coordination, which explains the weak convergence to a
13
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Figure 7: Chicken Game
small set of automata. The average payoff converges to just less than 3, as shown in Figure 6(d).
Figure 7 shows the results of the simulations in the Chicken game (see Figure 2(d)). In this
game, there are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria: (A,B) and (B,A). Recall that in the Chicken
game, the cooperative outcome of (A,A) yields higher-than-average payoffs for each of the players
when alternating between the pure-strategy Nash equilibria. The results in plots (a) and (b) of
Figure 7 look similar to those in the Prisoner’s Dillemma, where game-play is converging to a
small set of automata attaining the cooperative outcome of (A,A). This observation is confirmed
in Figure 7(c), which shows that a large percentage of simulations end with payoffs corresponding
to the cooperative outcome. Finally, Figure 7(d) suggests that average payoff converges to just
below 3.
5 Discussion
In Figure 8, the predictions of the modified EWA-lite model are validated with experimental
(human) data and compared to the predictions of the (action)-EWA-lite benchmark. Mathevet
and Romero (2012) provide experimental data on the four games reported in Section 4. The data
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Figure 8: We compare simulations of the (action)-EWA-lite benchmark model and the modified EWA-lite model
with human data from the experiments of Mathevet and Romero (2012). The simulations assume that λ = 5, and
the payoffs are averaged over the last 200 periods (periods 800−1, 000), while the experimental results with human
subjects consist of averaging the last ten periods of fixed pairs in repeated games.
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consists of 27 pairs of subjects playing a game with a fixed opponent. Each pair plays 30 periods
with certainty, after which the probability of playing an additional period is 0.9. Some common
trends emerge from the data, such as convergence to the cooperative outcome in the Prisoner’s
Dilemma game, alternations between the two pure-strategy Nash equilibria in the Battle of the
Sexes game,11 convergence to the payoff-dominant Nash equilibrium in the Stag-Hunt game, and
mutual conciliation in the Chicken game. The simulations of the modified EWA-lite model match
the experimental data quite well. On the contrary, the (action)-EWA-lite benchmark model does
well in the Stag-Hunt game, but fails to predict the most likely outcomes in the other three games.
As Figure 8 shows, the extension from actions to even a simple class of repeated-game strategies
improves predictions in the games studied here. It should be noted that the richer specification
of strategies improves predictions in two distinct ways. First, it allows for convergence to non-
trivial sequences such as alternations in the Battle of the Sexes game. Convergence to any non-
trivial sequence with an action-learning model is difficult, as it requires probabilities of actions
to drastically change from period to period. Second, the richer set of strategies allows more-
sophisticated strategic behavior, such as punishments, which leads to behavior such as cooperation
in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game or mutual conciliation in the Chicken game. Such strategic
behaviors cannot be incorporated easily in an action-learning model.
Hanaki, Sethi, Erev, and Peterhansl (2005) ran simulations with a reinforcement-learning
model over a population of agents using two-state automata. The population of 1,000 agents
started by playing a pre-experimental phase consisting of, at least, 20,000 periods. The players
were randomly matched until the population-averaged attractions converged. Once the population
attractions converged, players were randomly selected from the population to play in a fixed
pair. However, the incorporation into our model of a belief-based component to complement
reinforcement learning, expedites convergence while dispensing of the pre-experimental phase.
Notice that in order for a given strategy’s attraction to be updated in a reinforcement-learning
model, the strategy must be played first. When beliefs are added to the model, the attractions
for every strategy are updated at the end of every cluster. Therefore, the attraction on a strong
strategy can start to increase with the first attraction-update; in contrast, implementing only
the reinforcement component, keeps a strong strategy unaffected in terms of attraction-weights
until it gets selected. The timelines of attraction probabilities and average payoffs in Figures 4-7
suggest that the convergence in these simulations is, indeed, relatively fast. The timelines show
that the simulations do not change drastically after the first 200 or 300 periods. Given that the
cluster length is 20 periods, this suggests that the simulations are converging within the first ten
to fifteen attraction updates.
11The fact that observations reside only in the vertex (2,4), and not (4,2), is a result of how players’ roles were
assigned. For more details, see Mathevet and Romero (2012).
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Next, we identify the Nash equilibria automata picked by the modified EWA-lite model.12
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, with the exception of Automaton 1,“Always-Cooperate,” all
other automaton-pairs picked by the modified EWA-lite model constitute Nash equilibria. In the
Battle of the Sexes, all automaton-pairs that lead to alternations are Nash equilibria.13 However,
Automaton 21, which is played with relatively high frequency, as shown in 5(a), is not a Nash
equilibrium when matched with any other automaton. In the Stag-Hunt game, all automaton-
pairs picked by the model are Nash equilibria. Finally, in the Chicken game, all automaton-pairs
that lead to the cooperative outcome (A,A) are Nash equilibria. Automaton 2 and Automaton 22
also occur with strictly positive frequency. Though this pair is not a Nash equilibrium, it consists
of stage-game Nash equilibrium play with the exception of the first period.
6 Conclusion
The enterprise of finding out what strategies subjects actually choose has not progressed to the
degree that one would hope for. As a first step in that direction, we propose a modification of the
EWA-lite model to accommodate a richer specification of strategies, in a manner consistent with
belief learning. Crucially, the modified model nests the model of Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2007).
Similar to the framework in Hanaki, Sethi, Erev, and Peterhansl (2005), we make no a priori
assumptions on fairness or reciprocity as primitive concerns, allowing monetary payoffs to be the
sole driving force of learning. The predictions of the modified model are validated with data from
experiments with human subjects across four symmetric 2 × 2 games: the Prisoner’s Dilemma
game, the Battle of the Sexes game, the Stag-Hunt game, and the Chicken game. Relative to
the (action)-EWA-lite benchmark model, the modified EWA-lite can better account for subject
behavior.
There are many directions for future research. A stringent assumption imposed on the players
is that their strategies need to be updated simultaneously. Although such a venue could be
implemented with explicit communication of the players or via a reliable communication device
and enforceable commitment contracts, we would like to endow the players with the ability to
update their strategies with an idiosyncratic probability.
In addition, one might test the susceptibility of the results to small amounts of errors. In this
study, we assumed that the agents’ strategies were implemented by error-free automata. Agents,
in real life, engage in actions that are constrained by the limitations of human nature and the
12The matrices with the best-responses for each of the 26 automata in the four games considered are provided
in the Appendix.
13In the Battle of the Sexes game, players always prefer to play the opposite action to that of their opponent.
17
surrounding environment. Thus, agents often suffer from a measure of uncertainty about their
own, as well as their colleagues’ actions. In large and complex firms, for example, division chiefs
are often physically removed from each other and, consequently, unable to observe each other’s
behavior directly. Moreover, they are prone to errors in the implementation of their own actions
(along the lines of Selten’s trembling hand). Due to these disturbances, the decision makers may
occasionally draw incorrect inferences about their peers’ actions.
Lastly, it would be interesting to examine whether the results are robust to the symmetry of
the payoffs. One of the basic features of the games is that the values assigned to the game are the
same for both agents. Not uncommon, however, are social transactions not only where each agent’s
outcome depends upon the choices of the other, but also where the resources and therefore, possible
rewards of one agent exceed those of the other. A social interaction characterized by a disparity
in resources and potentially larger rewards for one of the two participants would, in all likelihood,
call into play questions of inequality. Thus, one could run two co-evolving populations with
asymmetric payoffs, to see how inequality comes into play and, in particular, how the asymmetry
in payoffs affects “cooperative” behavior.
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Appendix
Remark. The modified EWA-lite model nests the (action)-EWA-lite model of Camerer, Ho, and Chong
(2007).
Proof. This proof examines a special case of the modified EWA model. Assume that:
1. S1 = S2 = {Automaton 1,Automaton 2} in Figure 3, and
2. T = 1, so that all clusters have a length of one.
Given these assumptions, the modified EWA-lite model is equivalent to the (action)-EWA-lite model
of Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2007). To prove this, we show that in this special case, the terms φ,
δ, Ri, and E
j
i from the modified EWA-lite model are all equivalent to the corresponding terms in the
(action)-EWA-lite model presented in Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2007).
Since the clusters are assumed to all have length one, they are referred to as periods and denoted
with t rather than χ. Let ai(t) be the action chosen by player i in period t, and a(t) be the action profile
in period t. Notice that since there are only two strategies, the strategy can be inferred from a.
First, the reinforcement payoff in this case is,
Ri (t) =
1
T
∑
a∈h
gi (a) = gi(t), (3)
where gi(t) is the payoff to player i in period t. Next, determine the forgone payoff term E
j
i (t). Since
there are only two strategies in Si, the beliefs for the previous period are unambiguous; hence, we can
rewrite (2) as
B ((si, s−i) , a(t)) =
{
1 if (si, s−i) is consistent with a(t)
0 otherwise
= I (a−i, a−i(t)) ,
where I(x, y) equals 1 if x = y and 0 otherwise. Therefore,
p(si, s−i, a(t)) =
B((si, s−i), a(t))∑
r∈S−i
B((si, r), a(t))
= I (a−i, a−i(t)) .
Hence, we get that
Eji (t) =
∑
s−i∈S−i
pii(s
j
i , s−i) · p(si, s−i, a(t)) = gi
(
aji , a−i(t)
)
. (4)
Therefore, Ri(t) = E
j
i (t) = gi (a(t)) for a
j
i = ai(t).
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From equations (3) and (4), we get that the attention function is,
δji (t) =
{
1 if gi(a
j
i , a−i(t)) ≥ gi(t)
0 otherwise,
(5)
which is equivalent to the term in equation (4) in Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2007).
Next, to determine the decay function φ(·), notice that,
σ(s−i, t) =
1
t
t∑
j=1
p(si(j), s−i, h(j)) =
1
t
t∑
j=1
I (a−i, a−i(t)) ,
which is simply the frequency with which action profile a−i has been played in the t periods. This
is the same as the vector elements hki (t) from Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2007). Also, notice that
p (si, s−i, a(t)) = I (a−i, a−i(t)) is the same as the term rki (t) from Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2007).
Therefore, the surprise index is also the same:
Si(t) =
∑
s−i∈S−i
(σ(s−i, t)− p(si, s−i, a(t))2.
The change-detector function is
φi(t) = 1− 1
2
Si(t). (6)
In this special case, this corresponding term is equivalent to the term in equation (3) in Camerer, Ho,
and Chong (2007).
Finally, combining equations (1), (3), (4), (5), and (6), we get
Aji (t) =
φi(t) ·N (t− 1) ·Aji (t− 1) + δji (t) · Eji (t) + I(sji , si (t)) ·Ri (t)
φi(t) ·N (t− 1) + 1
=
φi(t) ·N (t− 1) ·Aji (t− 1) + δji (t) · gi(aji , a−i(t))
φi(t) ·N (t− 1) + 1 .
This is the equation of the (action)-EWA-lite model in Camerer, Ho, and Chong (2007).14 Thus, the
(action)-EWA-lite model is nested within this model, if T = 1, and Si = {Automaton 1,Automaton 2}.
Notice that the Averaged Choice Reinforcement model and the Weighted Fictitious Play model are both
special cases of the (action)-EWA-lite model and, by the above, also special cases of the modified EWA-lite
model. 
14Note that the term (1− δji (t)) · I(aji , a−i(t)) is always 0 when using the self-tuning functions.
22
Complexity
In the exercise studied, we considered one-state and two-state finite automata in order to limit the
computational burden of the simulations and reduce the automaton-complexity in accord with bounded
rationality. Abreu and Rubinstein (1988) defined the complexity of a strategy as the number of states of
the minimal automaton implementing it. Despite its natural appeal, the latter measure is insufficiently
sensitive to some essential features of complexity, such as the monitoring of an opponent’s actions. In
particular, it is possible under this measure that an informationally demanding strategy that requires
a fine monitoring of the opponent’s action will be awarded the same degree of complexity as one that
requires little or no monitoring of the opponent’s action. Since the extent of monitoring required is
certainly one aspect of complexity involved in implementing a strategy, greater complexity should be
assigned to strategies requiring more monitoring. Thus, we would rather define complexity in terms
of the number of state-action pairs (qi, a−i) that require distinct transitions. This is easily seen to be
the same as the number of transitions R(Mi). Under this measure of complexity, Mi c Mj if and
only if R(Mi) > R(Mj). Furthermore, it is important to notice that this measure completely orders all
automata with respect to their complexity.15 Consider the finite automata in Figure 9. Our criterion
ranks Automaton 7 as the most complex of the four depicted, despite having fewer states than the
three-state Automaton.
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Figure 9: Automaton-Complexity
Complexity Robustness
To check for robustness of the results, we ran simulations using a larger set of automata. The natural one
level up from two-state automata is to use three-state automata. However, the minimal set of three-state
automata consists of 1054 automata, which proves to be computationally intensive. As an alternative, we
consider all automata with complexity, as defined above, of less than or equal to 4, (R (Mi) ≤ 4). This
set consists of 228 automata ranging from one state-automata to four-state automata. Note that the set
also includes all two-state automata. The simulations using the larger set of automata are displayed in
15Alternatively, one could use the measure of complexity suggested by Banks and Sundaram (1990), where an
automaton Mi is more complex than Mj if Mi is at least as complex as Mj along one of the twin dimensions
of transitional complexity and size, and strictly more complex along the other. Such a criterion involves vector
comparisons and is, consequently, not “complete” (i.e., does not permit a comparison between all machines).
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Figure 10. The plots preserve the trends exhibited in the earlier results with two-state automata, but
are more noisy. The additional noise can be attributed to the bigger cardinality of the strategy space,
which leads to slower convergence.
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Figure 10: Modified EWA-lite simulations with automata of complexity 4 or less (R (Mi) ≤ 4). Simulations are
taken with λ = 5 and payoffs are averaged over the last 200 periods (periods 800− 1, 000).
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Best Responses and Nash equilibria
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Figure 11: We indicate the Nash equilibrium automaton pairs. The red (horizontal) lines correspond to the best
responses of Player 2, whereas the blue (vertical) lines correspond to the best responses of Player 1. The circled
crosses represent Nash equilibria.
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